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AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY IN EUROPE *
FRANCIS DE K
The progress in the technical sciences which followed the
industrial revolution, bringing with it the development of machine
industry and the speeding-up of communication, has had as im-
portant effects upon certain rules of law as upon the human
relations which are regulated by those rules. The increased pace
of a mechanized society has had a particularly strong influence
upon certain aspects of tort law.
From the time of the Roman law down almost to the pres-
ent, legal liability for invasion of interests of personality or prop-
erty through external violence presupposed the existence of fault
on the part of the actor, whether that fault consisted of misfeas-
ance or nonfeasance. Liability without fault was only exception-
ally recognized, either by the Roman jurists, in the modern Euro-
pean codes, or in the English common law. Various norms were
set up in what seems like an attempt to provide a convenient legal
yardstick for measuring fault. Of such norms the most striking
is that of an ideal standard based upon the theoretical conduct of
an ordinary person or a bonus pater familias. If the individual
measured up to this standard, the law attached no importance
to the fact that his acts had prejudiced another, and the actor was
under no duty to make compensation for the injury which he had
caused.
Today we find a different approach to this problem. The
change did not occur suddenly, but was the result of a slow evolu-
tion. The causes and course of this evolution make a fascinating
chapter in legal history for those who are interested in the effect
* Material for this article has, in part, been collected in connection with a
study undertaken by the writer for the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents, which is carrying on an extended investigation of this
problem under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council.
The writer wishes to express his grateful appreciation for the valuable
assistance which he received in the preparation of his study from Professor
Joseph P. Chamberlain and Dean Young B. Smith, of Columbia Law School.
(271)
272 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
which the requirements of daily life produce on law and who
search for the ways in which law responds to the pressure brought
upon it by changing economic and social conditions.
The law of liability covers a field too vast to permit the
tracing of all phases of this evolution in a single article, but a
study of one particular aspect is suggestive. This article, there-
fore, deals with one of the acute problems of our present day life,
namely, the problem created in the law of liability with respect
to the use of motor vehicles. The number of accidents and in-
juries caused by motor vehicles in Europe, as well as in the United
States, has increased in proportion to the increase in the number
of automobiles, and resulted in an enormous increase in litigation.
It is not surprising that this had a marked effect upon the law re-
garding liability. In some countries the law was changed by
legislation. In other countries, where the legislature was slow
in responding to the exigencies of the situation, the change was
brought about by the courts. What follows is a study of the judi-
cial and legislative methods by which various European countries
have endeavored to solve the problems of determining liability for
injuries and damages caused by the use of motor vehicles and a
consideration of the process through which these methods were
devised, pointing out the changes which resulted.
I.
Among the European countries where this change in the
law was brought about by judicial action without legislative aid,
France occupies the most conspicuous place.
Civil liability for injuries was determined in France on the
basis of five articles of the Civil Code. The general principles of
liability were expressed by the legislature of i8o6 as follows:
Art. 1382. "Any act by which a person causes damage to
another makes the person by whose fault the damage
occurred liable to make reparation for such damage."
Art. I383. "Everyone is liable for the damage he causes,
not only by his acts, but also by his negligence or impru-
dence."
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Art. 1384, § I. "A person is liable not only for the damage
he causes by his own act, but also for that which is
caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible
or of things which he has under his control." I
The text of articles 1382 and 1383 makes it clear that the
elements of civil liability under these provisions are (i) an act or
omission; (2) damage; (3) causal connection between the act
or omission and the damage; (4) fault (which should be under-
stood in its widest sense, whether resulting from negligence or
wilful injury). Decisive among the elements of liability under
these two articles is undoubtedly fault.2 In other words articles
1382 and 1383 incorporated the traditional principle of "no lia-
bility without fault"; and it should be observed that the other
codes, such as those of Germany or Switzerland, of a much later
date, have adopted the same general principle in determining civil
liability.
3
Articles 1382 and 1383 impose liability for damage caused
by one's own act, if such act constitutes a fault, article 1384, § I,
provides that one is liable not only for damage caused by his own
' Quotation from foreign texts, unless otherwise indicated by the writer.
The French text reads:
Art. 1382. "Tout fait quelconque de 'homme, qui cause A autrui un dom-
mage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, a le rgparer."
Art. 1383. "Chacun est responsable du dommage qu'il a caus6 non seule-
ment par son fait, mais encore par sa negligence ou par son imprudence."
Art. 1384. § I. "On est responsable non seulement du dommage que l'on
cause par son propre fait, mais encore de celui qui est caus6 par le fait des
personnes dont on doit rgpondre, ou des choses que l'on a sous sa garde."
2 LALOU, LA REsPONSA^rLrr CIVILE (1928) §§ 41 et seq.; 2 COLIN ET
CAPITANT, TRAITA PI.tMAENTAE DE DROIr CIVIL FRANsAIS (5th ed. 1928) 36 et
seq.; 2 PLANIOL, TRAITt ] LMENTARE DE DROIT CIVIL (9th ed. 1923) 269 et seq.
' GERMAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 823 (BGB) : "Whoever wilfully or negligently,
unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of
another, is bound to compensate the other for any damage arising there-
from. .. .. "
SWIss FEDERAL CODE OF OBLIGATION, Art. 4I: "Every person who causes
damage to another in an unlawful [non-privileged] manner, be it wilfully or be
it negligently or imprudently, is liable for damages.'" Cf. this with articles 1382
and 1383 of the French Civil Code. The Swiss Code considers the non-privi-
leged character of thc act causing damage also an element of liability. The
French Code, drafted a century earlier than the Swiss Code, omitting to limit
liability to damage caused by non-privileged [unlawful] acts, proceeded on the
Roman law principle: Necien l-edit, neino daminmn facit qui sw jure ititur.
[26 D. xxix 2, de danno infecto.] To balance this omission the theory known
in French law as abuse of rights (abus des droits) was developed by the French
courts and writers. See LAIOU, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 4o6 et seq.
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act, but also for the acts of persons for whom he is responsible or
of things under his control. While liability under articles 1382
and 1383 is expressly made conditional upon fault, no such con-
dition is expressed in article 1384, § I. It would seem, however,
that article 1384 should be read in the light of the two preceding
articles, which were drafted and enacted at the same time. It
should be observed that article 1384, § i, has an express connec-
tion with the two preceding articles. The phrase in article 1384,
§ i, "a person is liable not only for the damage he causes by his
own act," refers to articles 1382 and 1383 and by implication may
be interpreted to read: "a person is liable not only for the damage
he causes by his own fault, negligent or imprudent act". The ques-
tion may then be raised whether the liability imposed by article
1384, § i, for acts of persons for whom one is responsible or of
things under one's control does not also implicitly include the ele-
ment of fault. In other words, if article 1384, § i be read in the
light of the two preceding articles, would it not appear that acts of
other persons for which liability is imposed, might also be acts con-
taining the elements of fault, negligence or imprudence? And
since a thing cannot act, either negligently or otherwise, should
not the liability attached to "acts of things" be held dependent
on the fault, negligence or imprudence of the person in control?
Or rather should the fact that the text omitted the word fault
be considered intentional and the action of the legislature re-
garded as imposing a liability regardless of fault with respect to
either or both of these situations dealt with in article 1384, § i,
namely, liability for ( i ) damages caused by the acts of persons for
whom one is responsible and (2) damages caused by things which
one has under one's control?
There is nothing in the legislative history of the French
Civil Code which would indicate any intention on the part of the
drafters of the Code to base liability for ones own acts on fault
on the one hand, and set up another rule for liability for damage
caused by the acts of another or by a thing under the control of the
other. A reasonable reading of these texts would seem to indicate
that the basis of liability was considered in all three situations
dealt with in articles 1382 and 1383 on the one hand and in article
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1384, § i, on the other, to be fault.4  In fact, this was the inter-
pretation given originally to these code provisions. Until the
end of the nineteenth century the French courts as well as text-
writers rigorously adhered to this principle of considering fault
an essential and indispensable element in determining liability.'
The fact that liability arising under these articles of the
Code was based on fault, carried with it the consequence that the
burden of proof rested on the party which suffered damage.0
It was only at the very end of the nineteenth century that the
Workmen's Compensation Act effected a change in the French
law of torts with respect to a determined but nevertheless im-
portant type of case.7  This law was the result of a slowly evolv-
ing opinion in consequence of the industrial revolution, holding
that the industrialist should afford compensation for injuries
caused by his machines to his employees. The increasing fre-
quency of industrial accidents led public opinion to the conviction
that it is contrary to justice and equity that the worlnan should
have to prove the employer's fault,--a proof frequently impos-
sible, or, at least, exceedingly difficult to produce,-in order to
recover. The law of 1898 has eliminated fault as an element of
"For the legislative history of the articles of the Civil Code see 13 FEuST,
REcuEU. CoMPLr DES TRAVAUX PRLPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL (1836) 462 et
seq. As to liability for acts of persons for whom one is responsible, the subse-
quent paragraphs of article 1384 specify certain cases in which liability is im-
posed, namely: by virtue of § 2 the parents are liable for damages caused by
their minor children if they are living with their parents; § 3 imposes liability
on the master or employer for damages caused by the acts of his servants or
employees committed in the exercise of their functions; and § 4 imposes liability
on teachers and artisans for damages caused by their pupils and apprentices
while under their supervision. Two special cases of liability are dealt with in
articles 1385 and 1386. The first imposes liability on the owner or possessor of
animals regardless of whether they were under, or had escaped from, his control
when causing damage. By virtue of article 1386, the owner of a building is
liable for damages caused by it, if the accident was due to lack of proper upkeep
or structural defect.
See: LALOU, 1oc. cit. supra note 2; GARDENAT ET SALmoi-RiccI, D- L.A. RE-
SPONSABILITE CIVILE (1927) §§ 24-27 and cases cited under § 27. See also: 2
COLIN ET CAPITANT, op. cit. supra note 2, 366 et seq.; 2 PLANIOL, IOC. Cit. supra
note 2.
See FREXCli CIVIL CODE, Art. 1315: "The person who claims the fulfill-
ment of an obligation must prove its existence." Cf. Swiss CoDE oF OBLIGA-
TION, Art. 42. It should be remarked that in continental law obligatio comprises
,-,'tractual as well as tortious relations.
rLoi SUR rs ACCmENTS DU TRAAL, April 9, i898. See DALLOZ, RECUEIL
PERIODIQUE (I898) 4.49 (hereinafter cited as DL-.-, PER.).
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the employer's liability, thus greatly facilitating recovery. It
also marked thereby the introduction into French law of the theory
of "professional risk" or "risk of undertaking" as a basis of lia-
bility in certain defined relationships, placing the risk on the one
best able to spread and distribute the loss.8
Risk as a basis of liability was, however, not accepted, and
only recently did the French legislature enact a law concerning
aerial navigation by which it imposed liability, regardless of fault,
on the user for damages caused by airplanes,-a liability somewhat
similar to that imposed on employers for industrial accidents. 9
Except for these two statutes,-The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and the Aerial Navigation Law,-there was little in-
clination evidenced by French text-writers, and, until recently,
on the part of the French courts, to depart from the Aquilian
theory of liability based on fault. Liability, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, was determined on the basis of articles 1382 and
1383 of the Civil Code, except in specific situations provided for in
the Code.10 It should also be pointed out that up to the end of
the nineteenth century, article 1384, § i was almost completely dis-
regarded by the courts. Even in cases where damage was caused
by a thing, liability was dependent upon the fault or negligence
of the person in control, to be proven by the plaintiff."
A change occurred when, in a decision of June 16, 1896,
the Court of Cassation, invoking article 1384, § i, held the
owners liable for injuries caused by the explosion of a steam-
engine. The highest court of France did not even admit proof
by the owner that the accident was due to a defect in construction.
12
8 As to the theory of "professional risk", or, as the French call it, "objec-
tive liability", see 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, Op. cit. supra note 2, 367; 2 PLANIoL,
op. cit. supra note 2, 315 et seq.
"Loi RELATIVE k LA NAVIGATION AERIENNF. May 31, 1924, Art. 53:
'The exploiter of an airplane is absolutely liable (responsable de pleib
droit) for damages caused by the movements of the airplane or of objects which
may detach from it, to persons or property situated on the surface. This liabil-
ity cannot be mitigated or rebutted except through proving negligence of the
victim." See DALL., PER. (1925) 4.41 et seq.; Journal Officiol, Juue 3, 1924.
"Supra note 4.
"Dame Painvin v. Deschamp, (Cass. Civ., 187o) DALL., PER. (1870) 1.361.
'2 Guissier, Coussin, et Oriolle v. Vve. Teffaine, (Cass. Civ., 1896) DALL.,
PER. (1897) 1.433; SIREY, REcuEIL DES LOIS ET DEs ARRETs (1897) 1.17 (herein-
after cited as SIR.). A steam engine, constructed by Oriolle and owned by Guissier
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Thus, instead of predicating liability upon fault, the court held
that the owner of the machine causing damage is liable although
there was no fault. Moreover, the Court said that this liability
can be avoided only by proving force majeure or an unforeseen
event, and did not regard the fact that the defect was due to the
fault of the constructor and was unknown to the defendant, as
constituting a defense. This decision was interpreted by some
writers, and also by some courts, as a turn in jurisprudence of the
Court of Cassation, in no longer basing liability arising under
article 1384, § i on the traditional notion of fault, but on owner-
ship or control. This idea, however, was later denied by the Court
in the case of Foulatier v. Busson-Lavali~re et Colas, declaring
the liability of the owner is not based on ownership, but on pre-
sumed fault with consequent shifting of the burden of proof.1 3
Attention should be called to the language of the Court
in this case. The Court stated that article 1384, § i raises a
presumption of fault (prsomption de faute), which presumption
results in shifting the burden of proof (renversement de la charge
de la fpreuve). Although these expressions,-technical terms in
and Coussin, exploded while being operated by Teffaine, an engineer in their
employ, who died in consequence of the injuries thus received. His widow sued
the owners for damages, who, in turn, sued the constructor. The trial court
rejected both suits, which decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals of
Paris. By analogy to Art. 1386 (liability of owners of buildings), the Court
held that Guissier and Coussin were liable for damages when the accident causing
the injury was due to a defect of construction. This decision was affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Cassation, which stated that since the explosion was due
to a defect in construction and not to cas fortuit (unforeseen event) or force
mnajertre (superior force, act of God) which would have exonerated the owners
of the machine, they were therefore, liable by virtue of Art. 1384, § i. This liabil-
ity cannot be rebutted, said the Court, by proving the fault of the constructor of
the machine or a hidden defect. Cf. Vve. Grange v. Cie Gle. Transatlantique,
(Cass. Req., 1897) DALi., PER. (1897) 1.440, where defendant company was held
not liable for an accident caused by the explosion of one of its ships' steam
engines because it was proved that the engine was in perfect condition and the
explosion was not caused by a defect in construction.
(Cass. Req., i9o8) DALL, PtR. (1909) 1.73; SI. (91o) 1.17. The case
came on appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of Bourges [DALL.,
PE. (19o6) 2.2491 for violation of article 1384, § 1, deciding that the owner of
a threshing machine is liable for fire originating in the machine and destroying
property. The Court of Appeals said that liability is a consequence of owner-
ship and is not refuted by proving a defect in the machine or negligence of the
person operating it. The Court of Cassation, while affirming this decision,
pointed out that liability ;= not based on ownership, bUt on control. The pre-
sumption of fault can be rebutted only by proof that the machine was not under
his or his employee's control when the fire started, or that it was caused by an
unforeseen event, force najeure, or a cause not imputable to him.
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French legal language,-occur subsequently in almost every case
involving the application of article 1384, § i, and are used by
every writer in the discussion of this text, they have a different
meaning from that normally attached to them in Anglo-American
law. When the French courts speak of "presumption of fault"
raised by article 1384, § I, against the owner of a thing causing
damage, they do not mean a true presumption which the defend-
ant can rebut by proving that he was not negligent. There is
no similarity between the Anglo-American doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and the French doctrine of prisomption de faute. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur at most raises a presumption of
negligence against the defendant which may be rebutted, or,
according to many cases, it shifts the burden of going forward
with the evidence; but in either event the defendant is not liable
if the evidence shows that he was not at fault. When the Amer-
ican courts speak of presumptions they speak of procedural de-
vices which operate to shift the burden of ultimately persuading
the jury on a given issue or, in the alternative, to shift the burden
of going forward with the evidence. 14  Thus, the French
prisomption de faute, on the other hand, has a much more far-
reaching effect. Taken literally, the expression is indeed mislead-
ing to an American lawyer. It is not a presumption of fault in
the true sense of the words for it cannot be refuted by proving
absence of fault. In the very language of the courts, this "pre-
sumption of fault" cannot be rebutted except by proving force
majeure or an unforeseen event (cas fortuit) or a cause not im-
putable to the person presumed to be liable--i. e. contributory
negligence or the fault of a third party. What the courts really
mean by "presumption of fault" is, therefore, a rule of substantive
law imposing liability regardless of fault. The sense in which
the terms "presumption of fault" and "shifting the burden of
proof" are used by French judges and writers should constantly
be kept in mind, when, on the subsequent pages of this article,
references are made thereto.
" See Bohlen, The Effect of Relttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof (igig) 68 U. oF PA. L. REv. 307.
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Since the beginning of our century, French courts have re-
sorted more frequently to article 1384, § I for the determination
of liability for damages caused by inanimate things. This text
was interpreted by the courts as raising a "presumption of fault",
but there was a considerable divergence of opinion in the different
jurisdictions as to the true meaning and extent of this "pre-
sumption". The most important qualification devised by the
courts,-a qualification which attained particular significance
when, in cases of automobile accidents, a choice had to be made
between articles 1382 or 1384, § I for the determination of lia-
bility,-was that article 1382 alone is applicable whenever the
accident occurred at a moment when the thing was operated by
the hand of man.15 On the other hand, article 1384, § i is ap-
plicable whenever the damage is caused by the thing alone without
participation of man. In a decision, usually referred to by French
writers as one of the leading cases as to the interpretation of
article 1384, § i, the Court of Cassation affirmed a decision of
the Court of Appeals of Paris which held the owner of a restau-
rant liable to pay damages for injuries which a guest received in
consequence of the explosion of a siphon of seltzer-water placed
on a nearby table.' 6 Defendant pleaded that the burden was on
the victim to prove the fault of the company or' its employees.
The Court of Cassation held article 1384, § I applicable and the
decision proper because the company did not produce proof to
rebut the fault presumed by virtue of that article.' 7 It should
be remarked that the Court of Cassation did not take into con-
sideration whether or not the siphon was abandoned or manipu-
lated by man when the explosion occurred. It simply held article
1384, § i, with its "presumption of fault", applicable, and stated
the extent, for the time being, of this presumption in declaring
that it can be avoided by the person in control only by proving
'EBugand v. Ville de Dijon, (Cour d'Appel, Dijon, 19o7) DAU., PER.
(1910) 2.132.
"Soc. du Caf6 Riche de Rivaud, (Cass. Civ., 1914) DATU., PR. (914)
1.303; SIR. (914) L128 [aff'g (Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1912) SIR. (1913) 2.J64].
' Cf. Chemin de fer de l'Ouest v. Mercault, (Cass. Civ., 1919) DA.L., PER.
(1922) 1.25, at 27, and note by Prof. Ripert; Si. (1922) 1.265, where a railroad
company was held liable for injuries caused by the explosion of an engine, the
cause of which remained unknown.
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an unforeseen event, force majeure, or contributory negligence of
the victim.
The disagreement as to the basis of liability for damages
caused by inanimate things, or more accurately, the discussion
whether this liability is determined by virtue of article 1382 ol
the basis of proved fault, or by virtue of article 1384. § i, on the
basis of fictional fault, became a particularly acute problem
chiefly with respect to injuries caused by motor vehicles. The
rapidly increasing number of accidents crowded the court calen-
dars heavily and, in view of the most contradictory decisions
rendered by the various jurisdictions, it is not surprising that this
topic became one of the most exploited in French juristic writings
during the past few years. "
When motor vehicles first appeared, liability for injuries
caused by this new means of transportation was determined on
" For discussion of the evolution of the law of liability in general see I
BAUIRY-LACANTINERI., TRAITf. Ti0tORIQtUE I'.r PRATIQUE DE l)ROIT CIVIL (Sup-
plement by J. Bonnecase, 1924) 296 et seq.; 5 I)IEioGui, TRAITI' IES OBI.IGA-
TrONS (1925) 380 et seq.; 2 GE.NY, MiTcIloDlE D'IN'rI-RPRETf-TATION FT SOIRCF.1s EN
DROIT PRIVEI POSITIF (2d ed., I919) § 174; LALoU, op. cit. supra note 2. See
also CORNU, DES PRI-SOMPTIONS DE FAUTE, EN MATILRE DE RESI'ONSABIITbI
CIvLE (Thesis, Montpellier 1929) Avignon; CAI.IERRE, DFs CIosEs INANIMfES
SOUMISFS A 2OIIOIGATION DE GARDE (Thesis 1929) Rennes; HALI.HR, ESSAI SUR
L'INFLUENC. lU FAIT iHr1" DE I.A FAUTE IE LA VIC'rIME SUR SON I)ROIT A Rf'PA-
RATION (Thesis ig-Q) Paris. For a comprehensive exposition of the whole
French law of liability on the basis of articles 1382-1386 of the Civil Code as
interpreted by the courts, see GARDENAT lcr SALMON-RicCI, op. cit. supra note 5.
Among the numerous treatises devoted specially to liability for injuries
caused by motor vehicles, the following may be referred to: (CI,'VAIlEl.R, LA
REI'SPONSABILIT ImI.;s AUTOMOBILISTEiS l. LA JURISIRU)ENCi RfE.CFNTE (Thesis
1926) Paris; CIARIEIR, DE LA RESi'ONSAiMrT DES PROI'RICTAIRE.S 'AUTOMOiILaS
AU CAS i)'AccillNTS (Thesis 1026) Angers; I BE.;RINGIUIER, Lf PROBID:ME D-
LA CIRCULATION (1929) (especially pages 141 rt seq.) ; GUAIL, LiUs ACCmNTS
AUTOMOBILES ET LEURS CONSEQU"NCES JURI-IIIS. (1929) ; AMBI.ARiO, Ll.
CODE DE LA ROUTE (1929) ; TAUZIN, LA RPSPONSAIII1TfE DES PROPRIE.I-TAIRF-S
DE CHOSES DANGEREUSES -.T SI' fCIAI.INT ims AIrorTOimIIASTFS (1929);
TAUZIN, UN EXE.MPLE. lIE "SOCIALISME JURIIIIQUE" EN MATli.RE ll . RE-i'ONSA-
BIILITL CIviLE: L'ARTICi.E: 1384 i' LE.S ACi'mTS l)AtITOMOiIlS (Thesis
1929) Paris; Luco, l)m-S CONFLrrS l': PRfsomiI'OriNS DE IAUtE A l: L'OCASION
DE LA CIRCULATION DES VEITICUILE.S (1928).
On the problem of liability for injuries receivt-d bv free passengers (gratiii-
tons -transport) see CHATILLON, LE IiRANSI'ORT (GRArUIT l.K, IERSON NES EN
AUTOMOnI.x (Thesis 1929) Paris; VE. ) LA RESI'ONSAII.IITE CIvI.E DU
TRANSPORTIIUR BfENfVOLE (Thesis, Montpellier 19o) L.yon.
No all, mpt hi 11|-n made(- to refrr to the iimiinerable articles and notes
which were published in various French legal periodicals and in the annotated
publications of court decisions.
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the basis of article 1382 of the Civil Code. The injured party had
the burden of proving the fault of the person causing the injury. '
As has been pointed out by a student of this problem, at
the beginning of the era of the automobile, this means of trans-
portation, being exceedingly expensive, was at the disposal of
well-to-do people only; moreover, it was regarded primarily as
a means of pleasure. It can be easily understood that public
opinion as a whole on questions relating to the automobilist was
not favorable to him. Nevertheless, neither the legislature nor
the courts were inclined to respond to public clamor and come to
the aid of pedestrians through stiffening the rules of liability. The
reluctance of the legislature can partially be explained by the fear
that to impose a strict liability might have retarded the develop-
ment of a promising industry.2 0  In fact, the only legislative step
taken in this direction before the war was a statute making it a
special crime to leave the place of an accident ("hit and run"
act) 21
The only help the courts afforded to the victim was a certain
liberality in admitting proof and some endeavor to widen the
" Fisson v. Maison & Boutellier, (Cour d'Appel, Rouen, Corr., 1898) DALU.,
PER. (1899) 2.295, is the first reported decision concerning injuries caused by an
automobile. Appellee's coach met Fisson's automobile, whereupon the horse
shied and wrecked the coach, and appellee was gravely injured. The court,
rejecting a suit for damages, said that appellant would be liable only if it were
proved that he committed a personal fault consisting in "inadvertence, impru-
dence, inattention, negligence or disregard of traffic rules", and that this fault
was the cause of the accident. No provision of the Civil Code was invoked.
While the court made no direct reference to the dangerous nature of this new
means of transportation, it was pointed out that the court did not disregard the
"quite particular care" which appellant was bound to exercise in operating a
vehicle of this nature.
On the other hand, the novel or dangerous character of automobiles was
emphasized from the very beginning by Swiss courts. Soc. de Frise v. de
Feldau, (Fed. Sup. Ct. of Switzerland, 1903) 29 Recueil Officiel des Arr~ts des
Tribunaux Fld6raux Suisses 2. 273. (herinafter cited as Rec. Off. Suisse)
holding the person causing injury to, a particular degree of care, the disregard
of which alone is sufficient to constitute negligence. See also: Haas v. Hey-
man, (Fed. Ct., 195o) 31 Rec. Off. Suisse 2, 416.
CHEVALIER, op. cit. supra note I8, at II ct seq.
Loi DU 17 JUILLET 1908 tTABLISSANT, EN CAS D'AccIDENT LA REsPoNSA-
BILITt DE CONDUCTEUS DE VEHICULES DE TOUT ORDRE. See DArr... PER. (1908)
4.68; Journal Officiel, July 20, 19o8. The statute provides that any driver
who, after causing an accident, leaves the place in order to escape civil or
criminal liability, shall be punished by imprisonment and fine, without prejudice
of punishment which may be imposed in addition. It is furthermore provided
that in case articles 319 and 320 of the Penal Code are applicable (i. e., if
homicide through imprudence or involuntarily inflicted wounds and injuries are
involved), the penalties provided by these articles qhall be doubled.
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conception of fault. But the application of article 1384, § 1, to
determine liability for automobile accidents, although advocated
by some outstanding writers, found no favor with the judiciary.
Almost invariably it was held applicable only if the automobile
was not being operated by anyone when the injury was inflicted.
22
The outbreak of the war diverted attention from this prob-
lem. After the war, however, the rapid increase in the number
of motor vehicles, together with their increasingly extensive em-
ployment as a practical means of transportation, brought forward
the question in an acute form, and it became an inspiring theme
of juristic speculation. The controversy raged around the ques-
tion whether liability for injuries caused by the use of motor
vehicles should be determined on the basis of article 1382 or
article 1384, § i of the Civil Code. On the basis of a survey of
the above-indicated literature,2 the theories advanced may be
grouped as follows :--
(i) One school of thought desired to retain article 1382 as
the basis of liability, imposing the burden on the victim of prov-
ing fault. It was suggested, however, that the sphere of appli-
cation of this article be enlarged by minute prescription of traffic
rules. If an accident occurred, the violation of such rules could
'Gouineau v. Naud, (Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux, igog) DALW, Pm. (1912)
2.255. Suit for damages by appellee on basis of article 1384, § i. Appellee's
child was killed by appellant's car. The court refused to apply article 1384
because the accident was due not to the vehicle, to the risk inherent in it, but to
the fact that it was directed in a vicious or careless manner by its driver. It
was held, therefore, that article 1382 alone was applicable and the burden of
proof was placed on the victim. Appellee also invoked a statute of 1899 (traffic
rules) which, according to his pleading, created a presumption of fault The
court denied this assertion, saying that the claimant has to prove the disrcgard
of these rules as well as the causal relation between this disregard and the acci-
dent The court pointed out that the mere itse of an automobile cannot create
a presumption. The court indicated that it would be liberal in admitting proof
by saying that the management of an engine so powerful requires particular
attention and precaution and the slightest negligence, such as excessive speed,
must receive great weight.
Accord: Lon & Cie. v. Bouche, (Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux, 1912) DAuI,
Ptn. (1912) 2.226.
Cf. Vve. Goffin v. Cie. des mines de Bethuse, (Cass., 1911) DALU., PR.
(191) 1.354; SIR. (1914) T.214.
In Switzerland it was held that the observance or disregard of traffic rules
does not, in itself, determine the existence of liability. Tornare v. Brandt, (Fed.
Ct., 19o7) 33 Rec. Off. Suisse 2.555.
= Supra note i8.
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be ascertained and the proof of fault would follow. In short,
a broader and more precise definition of "fault" was sought.
(2) A second school of thought, finding this inadequate,
while retaining fault as the determining element of liability,
advocated the shifting of the burden of proof. It should be
again observed that although the advocates of this theory invari-
ably speak about the "shifting of the burden of proof" (renverse-
ment de la charge de la preuve), two groups can be distinguished
within this school which, in fact, while using the same technical
terms, suggested two entirely different proceedings. One group
argued that article 1382, putting the burden of proof on the plain-
tiff, is more favorable to the automobilist than to the victim.
It was also argued that the former is usually in a better financial
position and thus he can better defend himself. Therefore, this
group suggested the remedy of "shifting the burden of proof" to
be accomplished by the application of article 1384, § i. In other
words, this group advocated a presumption, or prima facie case,
of fault, similar to the Anglo-American rule of res ipsa loquitur.
The other group argued that a person, in putting a motor
vehicle into circulation, created a risk of accident through this
dangerous instrument. Therefore, applying the principle ubi
emolumentum ibi onus, he should bear the consequences. Not
being satisfied that this can be covered by article 1384, § i, this
group advocated legislation to supplement article 1382, providing
specifically for the liability of drivers and introducing the system
of "presumed fault" with the consequent "shifting of the burden
of proof". While this group also spoke of "presumed fault" and
"shifting the burden of proof", they were really advocating a
change in the rule of substantive law and not merely a change in
procedure. In other words, a "presumption of fault" rebuttable
only by proving force majeure, an unforeseen event or contribu-
tory negligence.
(3) Finally, a third theory openly and frankly suggested
risk instead of fault as the basis of liability for damages caused by
motor vehicles to be brought about by statute similar to the Work-
men's Compensation Act or the Aerial Navigation Law.
24
' See 2 COLIx ET CAPiA NT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4o2 and 367; CHEVA-
LIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 17 et seq.
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An indirect effort to improve the situation and facilitate
recovery was made by the legislature in enacting, in 1922, the
Code de la Route,2D containing detailed rules for vehicle traffic,
and, in 1923, a statute providing that in case of a civil dMlit the
competent tribunal may be either that of the defendant or the place
of the accident. 26 This departure from the traditional principle
actor sequitur forum rei was made primarily in the interest of
victims of automobile accidents as is apparent from the motives
set forth in the introduction of the bill.
The provisions of the Code de la Route were intended to
facilitate a more precise determination of the causes of accidents
and, therefore, of liability. The courts continued to exact from
the victim proofs of the driver's fault and they insisted on a
distinction between accidents occurring while the car was being
operated and those caused by the vehicle alone, without the
participation of a human agency. In the former case they held
that the accident was due to an act of man (fait de l'homme) and
not an act of the thing itself (fait de la chose), and, therefore,
held that article 1382 alone was applicable.27  Article 1384, § I
could be relied upon only if the accident occurred without a
human agency; for instance, if the car, while abandoned by its
driver, ignited and exploded, injuring a passer-by. Up to 1924,
rarely did any French court apply article 1384, § i without this
distinction between an independent act of the thing and an act
of man.
2S
A new chapter was opened by the decision of the Court of
Cassation in the Bessihres case on July 29, 1924, which caused
great confusion in juristic circles.2 9  Plaintiff's wife was in-
DALL., PER. (1922) 4.324, Law of December 31, 1922, [modified by the
law of September 12, 1925, DALY., PEP. (1925) 4.358].
' LOi DU 26 NOVEN1BRE 1923, MODIFANT LES ARTS. 2 ET 59 DU CODE DE
PROCEDURE CIVILF. See DALL., Paa. (1925) 4.46; Journal Officiel, Nov. 27,
1923.
M eriam v. Vve. de Mathuisieuxl, (Trib. Civ., Nice, 192o) (192o) Gazette
du Palais (hereinafter cited as Gaz. Pal.) 1.584; Lajarige v. Loire, (Trib. Civ.,
Valence, i92I) (1922) Gaz. Pal. 1.195; De ]a Chapelle v. Pinel, (Cour d'Appel,
1 refluLlc, 1921) (1922) Gaz. Pal. 1.499.
Gallier v. Parisot, (Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1922) (1922) Gaz. Pal. 2.129.
Epoux Bessi~res v. Cie des voitures d'Abeille (Cass. Civ., 1924) DALL.,
PER. (1925) 1.5 (comment of Prof. Ripert); SiR. (1924) 1.321 (comment of
Prof. Esmein) ; (1924) Gaz. Pal. 2.385.
Cf. with Goffin case, supra note 22.
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jured by an automobile owned by defendant and operated by
Saverne, a soldier on leave of absence, to whom the defendant
entrusted the vehicle. The accident occurred when the car, in
consequence of a lurch, ran on the sidewalk and into a shop where
plaintiff's wife stood. Saverne was tried and acquitted by a
military court from criminal liability. A civil suit for 5o,ooo
francs damages was filed against the defendant company on the
basis of article 1384. The complaint charged defendant with
negligence in confiding the vehicle to Saverne and in not keeping
the vehicle in good condition. The trial court dismissed the
suit, holding article 1384, § I inapplicable because the breaking
of the steering wheel cannot be imputed to the machine alone,
independently of the act of its driver, as it occurred when the
operator steered violently to the left in order to avoid collision
with a bicyclist. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Paris, in an
interlocutory decision, ordered an expert report on the circum-
stances of the accident and, especially, on the question whether it
was due to the bad condition of the vehicle. The expert reported
that the breaking of the steerling wheel was not the cause, but a
consequence of the accident. On the basis of this expert opinion,
the Court of Paris rendered a decision holding article 1384, § I
applicable, without giving any reason or explanation for applying
it; but dismissed the suit on another ground, namely, that the acci-
dent not being caused by the bad condition of the vehicle, no fault
could be imputed to defendant and, thus, the "presumption of
fault" against him, raised by article 1384, § I, is rebutted. On
appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals because of false application of article 1384, § i. The
"presumption of fault" raised by that article, said the Court, can be
rebutted only by proof of an unforeseen event, force majeure,
or of a cause not imputable to the person in control. It is not
sufficient to prove that he committed no fault or that the cause
of the accident remained unknown. The Court of Paris, in exon-
erating defendant from liability because he could not be charged
with negligence and because the cause of the accident remained
unknown, was held to violate article i384, § i.
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The decision of the Supreme Court in the Bessi~res case was
followed by a spirited discussion of writers as to its significance;
it created much confusion in the courts, which rendered many
contradictory decisions, some adhering to and others refusing
to apply the principle pronounced by the Supreme Court,-what-
ever that principle was, for there was disagreement among the
individual courts as to the interpretation it should receive.
One opinion advanced by a group of jurists held that the
decision was chiefly based on the hidden defect in the vehicle
which caused the accident; the court had held article 1384, § I
applicable because of this defect in the thing; the Supreme Court
therefore intended to maintain the traditional distinction between
"acts of things" alone, to which article 1384, § i is applicable,
and "acts of things" with the participation of a human agency,
in which case article 1382 determines liability. The decision of
the Court of Appeals was set aside, according to this theory, not
because the Supreme Court intended to apply article 1384, § i
indiscriminately to every automobile accident. The reason for
this was found in that the Court of Appeals violated the law in
considering the presumption rebutted by proof of absence of
negligence and by the fact that the cause of the accident remained
unknown, whereas this presumption, according to a long line of
uninterrupted decisions, can be rebutted only by proving an un-
foreseen event, force majeure, or a cause not imputable to the
person in control. Hence, according to this opinion, by the Bes-
si~res decision the Court of Cassation did not abandon its tra-
ditional distinction between "acts of things" and acts of man.
Another group of jurists considered the Bessi~res decision as
marking a turn in French jurisprudence. According to them, the
Court of Cassation's intention was to apply article 1384, § I to
automobile accidents regardless of whether the injury was caused
by the vehicle while abandoned or while operated by its driver.
Their argument was that the Code, in raising a presumption
against the person in control of a thing, in no way made a dis-
tinction between an injury caused by the thing alone or by the
thing operated by a human agency. This distinction, not justified
by the text of the law, but for some time read into it, was simply
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abandoned by the Supreme Court which, in doing so, brought
French jurisprudence once more in harmony with the language
of the Code.
In view of this divergence of opinion, and also in view of the
fact that French judicial precedent has not the binding character
which it has in the common law, 30 it is not surprising that the
courts rendered contradictory judgments in automobile cases.
The division of the courts' opinions was almost equal. It would
necessitate a volume's space to follow and analyze the hundreds
of decisions in automobile cases which French courts rendered
since the Bessi~res decision of the Court of Cassation. The
review of a few cases will, however, show sufficiently the tendency
as well as the line of reasoning which determined the respective
attitudes taken by the courts in the two opposing camps.
It is to be noted that the point of view taken by the Court
of Cassation in the Bessijres case was also adopted by the Conseil
d'Etat (the highest administrative court in France). On Decem-
ber 22, 1924, in determining the state's liability for injuries caused
by an automobile operated in the service of the state, the Conseil
d'Etat said:
"Considering that the particularly dangerous character
of the circulation of motor vehicles at the present time
(a I'heure actuelle) necessitates admitting presumption of
fault against the operator of the vehicle causing the accident;
but that this presumption could be rebutted, either by proof
that the accident was due to a cause not imputable to the au-
thor, or to unforeseen event, or to force majeure, as the case
may be." 31
Concerning stare decisis and its place in continental, as compared with
Anglo-American law, see Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1922) 36
HARv. L. Rav. 940 et seq.; ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (2d ed., 193o) 122 et seq.,
201 et seq. passim; 2 GENY, MLTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVt POSTIF (2d. ed., 1919) §§ 145, 146, 149, 15o; I GxiKaE, DEUTSCHES
PRIVATRECHT (1895) 176 et seq.; SAURR, DIE GRUNDSXTZLICHE BEDEUTUNG
DER H6CHSTRICHTERLICHEN RECHTSPRECHUNG FUR PRAXIS UNn WISENSCHAFT
(1929) 122 et seq. Cf. article 5 of the French with article i of the Swiss Civil
Code.
'Soc. d'assurances mutuelles contre les "Les Travailleurs francais" v.
l'Etat, DALL., PER. (1925) 3.9 (with note of Professor Appleton) ; (1925) Gaz.
Pal. 1.157; DALLOZ, RECUEIL HEBDOMADAIRE (1925) 30 (hereinafter cited as
DALL, HEBD.). A truck owned and operated by the government overtook a
man leading horses, which shied. In struggling with them, their conductor fell
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Since the Bessijres decision, a number of jurisdictions re-
sorted, in a variety of automobile accidents, to article 1384, § i,
for the determination of liability, following the lead of the Court
of Cassation.3 2 Some courts went so far in their interpretation
of this "presumption of fault" that it amounted almost to impos-
ing absolute liability, as for instance, when defendant was held
liable for an accident caused by its stolen ambulance.,3
under the truck and was killed. The insurance company requested from the
government the reimbursement of the insurance paid to the victim's family.
This request was refused by the competent government department, whereupon
the company appealed to the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil, accepting the govern-
ment's proof that the accident was due to an unforeseen event, rejected the
appeal. Accord: Cie. d'assurance ]a Pr~srvatrice Grenet v. Ville de Paris,
(Conseil d'Etat, 1925) (i9--6) Gaz. Pal. 1.358.
'Perhaps one of the most enlightening decisions was rendered by the
Tribunal Civil of Lectoure in the case of Lannes v. Nouvel, (1925) DALL., PR.
(1925) 2.105 (with note of Prof. Josserand) ; (1925) Gaz. Pal. 2.113; DALL.,
HERD. (1925) 400, which was a suit for damages caused to plaintiff by defend-
ant's car, driven by the latter's employee. The suit was brought on the basis
of article 1384, § I, and, subsidiarily, on the basis of article r382 and article
1384, § 3 (master-servant rule). The decision contains a careful and exhaustive
Consideration of the development of the French law of liability and the evolution
in the interpretation by the courts of article 1384, § i. The court also discussed
the terms "unforeseen event" (cas fortuit) and force majeure, which are always
used concurrently in the language of almost every decision as rebutting "pre-
sumption of fault",--and pointed out that in reality, the two terms are identical.
See also Perrat v. Michel, (Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1924) DALI-, PER. (1925)
2.45; DALL, HEBD. (I924) 691, which is particularly interesting from the point
of view of burden of proof. It demonstrates that the French, in speaking of
the reversal of the burden of proof (renverserent de la charge de la preuve),
consequent upon the "presumption of fault" raised by article 1384, § i, understand,
in the language of an American lawyer, not merely shifting the burden of going
forward with the evidence, but shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.
In this case defendant, who ran over and killed plaintiff's 12 year-old child,
pleaded contributory negligence of the victim. As the testimony of witnesses
was contradictory, the court held that defendant had not rebutted the presump-
tion of fault raised by article 1384, § i, by proving contributory negligence and
he was condemned to pay 15,OOO francs damages.
Accord: Cardozo v. Declerq-Verhille, (Cour d'Appel, Douai, 1924) DAtU.,
PER. (1925) 2.45; (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.427; cf. Petit v. Silder, (Trib. Civ., Ver-
sailles, 1924) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.485.
Among the many decisions determining liability for injuries caused by auto-
mobiles, on the basis of article 1384, § i, the following may be referred to:
Troussi~re v. Bartassot, (Cour d'Appel, Riom, 1924) DALL., PM. (1925) 2-45,
(1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.176; Lemignon v. Pactat, plre et fils, (Trib. Civ., Seine,
1924) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.429; Largillet v. Drouard fr6res, (Cour d'Appel,
Douai, 1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 2.112; Branger v. Fabre, (Trib. Civ., Gaillac,
1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.429; Besnier v. Bazile, (Trib. Civ. Chateaubriant,
1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. i.43o; De Ravinel v. Francois, (Cour d'Appel, Nancy,
1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.756; Langlois & Borreau v. Michel, Thibault & Rein,
(Trib. Civ., Seine, 1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.659.
'Lavoye v. American Red Cross, (Trib. Civ.. Seine, 1925) (1925) Gaz.
Pal. 2.81. Contra: Jourdan v. Laporte, (Cour d'Appel, Nimes, 1928) DAL..,
HFBD. (1928) 375.
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These decisions followed with slight variations, the language
of the Court of Cassation in the Bessijres case, holding that
article 1384, § I is applicable to automobile accidents as the text
makes liable a person in control of a thing whenever it causes
injury regardless of whether the thing is directed or operated by
man; that this article raises a "presumption of fault" which can
be rebutted only by proving force majeure, unforeseen event or a
cause not imputable to the person in control. Many of these deci-
sions invoked the dangerous character of the automobile, explain-
ing the necessity of control on which, in turn, liability is based,
and which also justifies the presumption raised against the person
in control.34  It is evident, however, that the courts insisted on
interpreting article 1384, § i as merely raising a "presumption
of fault" and by no means imposing absolute liability. In other
words, they asserted that the traditional basis of liability was
maintained,-this basis being fault or negligence. This fault,
with respect to things under control,-under control because of
the dangers inherent in them,-merely raises a "presumption of
fault" and all the courts did was to broaden the notion of fault.
More correctly, they gave an increasingly wider application to the
Roman law principle of fault In lege Aquilia et culpa levissima
venit.35
This is similar to the doctrine of dangerous instrumentalities developed
recently in our courts. See (1922) 22 CoL L. REv. 68o. Cf. Voirin, La notion de
chose dangeretse, DA.L., HEBD. (1929) Chroniqne, i et seq.
' That fault as basis of liability was emphasized is evident from the lan-
guage of these decisions. See for instance Largillet v. Drouard frires, suprc
note 32.
"Whereas a motor vehicle constitutes in itself a dangerous object due
to its mechanism, motive power, etc. . . . and it exacts from its driver, in
addition to the greatest prudence, an unceasing attention, because, the snall-
est mistaken direction or a mere inattention, even for only a second, could,
quite apart from unforeseen events which sometimes cannot be imputed to
the driver, such as for instance a blow-out or an overturn, cause the
gravest accidents. . . ." (Italics ours.)
Cf. De Ravinel v. Frangois, supra note 32:
"Considering that this presumption of fault is based on the dangers
inherent in the thing itself . ; that these dangers impose on the person
in control the duty of watchfulness in order to avoid any injury which it
may inflict; that the fact that the thing has caused injury is sufficient to
establish that the watchfulness of the person in control was insafficient;
that from this originates, and this constitutes, his fault; . . ." (Italics
ours.)
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While an imposing array of courts indiscriminately applied
article 1384, § i, an equally imposing number of jurisdictions went
in the opposite direction, applying article 1382 whenever the acci-
dent was caused by an automobile operated by its driver, and ex-
acting, consequently, the proof of the driver's fault from the
victim.
3 6
The line of reasoning adopted by these jurisdictions, advo-
cating the application of article 1382 may be summarized as fol-
lows: It is impossible to assimilate an automobile, while being
operated, when it is constantly under the direction and subject
to the impulses of its driver, to an inanimate thing which may
sometimes cause injury due to an inherent defect, independently
of any human participation. 37  If this distinction is discarded,
a principle would be established that a person using a thing should
always be presumed at fault without any obligation on the victim
to prove fault and thus a liability would be imposed based on risk
which is not provided for in the actual state of legislation.3
Many courts admitted that the increasing number of auto-
mobile accidents justified anxiety and might necessitate mitigating
the rigidity of rules with respect to burden of proof in such
cases, but the remedy, they felt, ought not to come from the
indiscriminate application of article 1384, § i to all automo-
bile accidents. The shifting of the burden of proof would "abu-
sively increase" the liability of the automobilist."0 The principle
of the Code, exacting proof from the victim ought not to be
discarded by the arguments that automobile accidents are frequent
and that the victim is often unable to prove the driver's fault. The
Giraud v. L~onie Querel, (Cour d'Appel, Montpelier, 1924) DAU.., PER.
(1925) a44; Legerot v. Roche, (Trib. Civ., Bordeaux, 1924) (1925) Gaz. Pal.
i.1ii; Gallaud v. Crouzire, (Trib. Civ., Valence, 1924) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.276;
Nicolas v. Faivre, (Trib. Civ., Havre, i924) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.243; Vve.
Andr6 v. Fougere, (Trib. Civ., Lyon, 1925) DALL., Pn. ('925) 2.46; Bourret v.
Valette, (Cour dAppel, Nimes, 1925) DALU., PEE. (1925) 2.46, DALL., HEBD.
(1925) 151; Tissandier v. Pavy, (Cour d'Appel, Poitiers, 1925) DALL., PER.
(I925) 2.47; Fraper, Groux & Cie. v. Du~re, (Cour d'Appel, Rennes, 1925)
ALi, HERD. (i925) 5O8; Vve. Legras v. Rabineau, (Trib. Corr., Angers, 1925)
DAL., HEED. (1925) 551; Soc. d'alimentation stephanoise v. Dornsnach, (Trib.
Civ., Vienne, 1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 2.87.
Legerot v. Roche, supra note 36.
SBourret v. Valetta, supra note 36.
Gallaud v. Crouzi~re, supra note 36.
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courts should not be substituted for the legislature, which alone
has the power, if it finds it necessary, to impose a stricter lia-
bility, derogating from the droit commun, for injuries caused by
this instrument considered to be particularly dangerous.
40
This confusion in the French courts explains the great inter-
est of the French jurists in the problem of liability for automobile
accidents, and the flood of literature on this subject to which refer-
ence has been made.41
The Court of Cassation, while refraining until recently to
take a decisive step, consistently maintained the position it had
taken in the Bessires case. In setting aside several decisions
which refused to apply article 1384, § i to accidents caused by
automobiles under their driver's control, the Court clearly indicated
its intention to disregard the distinction, read into the text of
the Code, between acts of man and "acts of things". It may
safely be said that by 1927, the Court of Cassation had arrived in
this respect at a point which the French jurists consider as juris-
prudence fix~e.42 While the number of jurisdictions following
, Vve. Andr6 v. Fougere; Fraper, Groux & Cie. v. Du~re; Vve. Legras v.
Rabineau, all supra note 36.
'Supra note i8. How great this confusion was is perhaps best illustrated
by the fact that not only the different chambers of the same court rendered con-
tradictory decisions: Cardozo v. Declerq-Verhille; Largillet v. Drouard fr~res,
both suifra note 32, applying article 1384, § I; Desmettre v. Goeman, (Cour
d'Appel, Douai, 2' Chain. 1925) (i926) Gaz. Pal. 1.356 applying article 1.382.
But the same chamber of a court has changed its attitude from one session to
another due to the different conception of the judges composing the bench at
one time or another: De Ravinel v. Franqois, supra note 32, applying article
1384, § I; contra: Broggini v. Frigerio (Cour d'Appel, Nancy, 1925) (1926)
Gaz. Pal. 1.352.
*'Rauscher v. Morette, (Cass. Civ., 1927) DA.., HED. (1927) 557; Re-
neaut v. Huguenel, (Cass. Civ., 1929) DALL., HEBD. (I929) 234, which is par-
ticularly interesting because it indicates that, in the opinion of the Supreme
Court, the impossibility of cstablishing the cause of an accident cannot be re-
garded as an unforeseen event (cas fortidt), rebutting the presumption of fault:
Renault v. de Morgues, (Cass. Rtq., 1929) DALL., HFBD. (1929) 284 is illustra-
tive of circumstances destroying the presumption of fault by proving a cause of
accident not imputable to the person in control of a thing: Plaintiff's child was
injured by defendant's car. The Court of Appeals of Dijon rejected the claim,
holding that article 1384, § i could not be invoked if the automobile, when.
causing injury, was being driven. The Court of Cassation, on appeal held that
te presumption of fault is based on necessity of control over things which may
represent dangers to others without the distinction drawn by the Court of
Appeal. On the other hand, said the Court, this presumption is rebutted in the
case at bar by a cause not imputable to defendant, namely, that the child suddenly
left the sidewalk and got under the wheels of the vehicle, which was keeping
properly to the right and proceeding at an exceedingly low speed.
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the lead of the Court of Cassation undoubtedly increased as time
went on, nevertheless, the supreme tribunal of France was still
called upon frequently to correct the ultra-conservative attitude
taken by some recalcitrant courL. The principle of stare decisis
not being an accepted factor in the shaping of continental law,
it was not until February 13, 1930, that the Court of Cassation,
by rendering a decision with all Chambers of the Court sitting
(tout chambres rjunies) in a test case, finally pronounced the ap-
plicability of article 1384, § i to all automobile accidents. 43  This
decision, rendered in solemn session of the Supreme Court, be-
came, for all practical purposes, law which in all likelihood will
be followed by the lower courts. 44  The case in itself is like any
other automobile case, presenting no peculiar aspects; its impor-
tance is due solely to the fact that it was made a test case in the
battle fought for and against the applicability of article 1384, § 1,
to all automobile accidents.
A truck owned by defendant company and operated by their
employee ran over and gravely injured plaintiff's minor child.
Suit was brought on the basis of article 1384, § i. The trial
court 4 5 condemned defendant, holding that the presumption of
fault against a person in control of a thing is based on the dan-
gerous or novel character of the thing, regardless of whether it is
being operated by man. On appeal by defendant, who pleaded
that his liability can be determined on the basis of article 1382
only, the Court of Appeals of Besanqon reversed the decision.
On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Cassation set aside the appeal
Cf. Guillerminet v. Droin-Bouvard, (Cass. Civ., 1927) DALI., HEBD. (1927)
472, holding article 1384, § I applicable where plaintiff was injured by a stray
bullet in a shooting gallery owned by defendant. The Supreme Court held that
for the application of this text it is sufficient that there should be a thing subject
to the necessity of control by reason of the danger which it may represent to
others.
43 Jand'heur v. Les galeries belfortaises, (Cass., Chain. Riun.) DALL, HiEBD.
(1930) 129; (1930) La Semaine Juridique 271.
4 As to the significance and practical effects of the decisions rendered by
the Court of Cassation, tout chambres rjunies, see the law of April 1, 1837,
Lois ANNOTPES (2' ser., 1831-1848) 318; see also i Pi,.niO, op. cit. sapra note
2, § 205; I COLIN Er CAPITANT, op. Cit. supra note 2, 39-41.
"Trib. Civ., Belfort.
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court's decision and returned the case (renvoi) for a new decision
to the Court of Appeal of Lyon.46  The Court of Lyon decided
the case in accordance with the decision rendered by the Court
of Besanqon and contrary to the indications of the Court of Cas-
sation.4 7 The Court of Lyon reasoned as follows: Article 1384,
§ i cannot be applied to a mechanism while it is operated by man,
but only if the accident is caused by the machine alone. The
Court denied that automobiles are dangerous; they become such
only in the hands of "an incompetent or imprudent agent". The
trial court's attempt to base liability-a liability almost irrefu-
table-on article 1384, § I tends to introduce without legisla-
tive intervention, which is necessary to effect such a change, the
notion of risk (risque crW). Courts cannot be guided by social
considerations deduced from the number of accidents. "The
accident imputed to a motor vehicle in motion under human impul-
sion and direction," said the Court, "when no proof is offered
that it was due to a defect inherent in the vehicle, does not con-
stitute within the terms of article 1384, § i of the Civil Code, dam-
age caused by a thing over which one has control." Therefore,
the liability of the driver or that of his employer can only be
established if their fault is proved; and this proof must be ad-
duced by the victim.
It was on appeal from this decision of the Court of Lyon
that the Jand'heur case came a second time before the Court
of Cassation. The court set aside the decision in solemn session
and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals of Dijon, stating
that:
"Considering that the law does not, for the application
of the presumption it raises, distinguish according to whether
or not the thing which caused the damage was being operated
by the hands of a person, [the Court] decides that it is not
necessary that the thing should have a defect inherent in its
nature and likely to cause damage, because article 1384 makes
"4 For the renvoi of the Court of Cassation, see: (1927) Gaz. Pal. 1.4o7;
DALi., PER. (1927) 1.97; DALL., HFBD. (1927) 133.
' For the decision of the Court of Lyon, see (1927) Gaz. Pal. 2.398; DAL..,
HEMD. (1927) 423.
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liability consequent upon the control over the thing and not
upon the thing itself." 48
The Jand'heur decision puts an end to the bitter controversy
which raged during recent years in France as to liability for in-
juries caused by automobile accidents. The law on this point
seems to be settled conclusively: Article 1384, § I is applicable
regardless of whether the motor vehicle was operated at the
moment of the accident. This text raises a "presumption", which
can be rebutted only by proving force ivajeure or a cause not im-
putable to the person in control. There remains for juristic specu-
lation only the question whether this is good or bad law.49 But
whether it is good or bad, it undoubtedly is the outcome of an
interesting development of case law. It is a striking example
of how courts, even under a code system, respond to the pressure
of conditions, and, in the absence of, or a delay in, legislative in-
tervention, find a remedy for an increasingly problematic situa-
tion.
Two further observations seem to be appropriate with respect
to the Jand'heur decision. First, the Court of Cassation speaks of
"presumption of liability" (prisomption de responsabiliti) instead
of the traditional "presumption of fault" (prisomption de faute)
heretofore invariably used by all French courts whenever the
application of article 384, § i was discussed. Second, the Court
made no reference to the dangerous character of automobiles
which had previously been frequently invoked as justifying the
presumption. The Court was emphatic in pointing out that this
presumption is consequent upon control and not upon anything
with respect to the thing itself. Whether or not these changes
'The decision of the Court of Appeals of Dijon is not yet published. In
view of the law of April i, i837, supra note 44, which gives binding effect to a
decision rendered, after a second renvoi, in solemn session by the highest tribunal
of France, the Court of Dijon must decide a case according to the indication of
the Court of Cassation.
As to the discussions inspired by the various stages of the Jand'heur case
see Josserand, Garde ct conduite des automobiles, DALu-, HEn. (1927) Chron-
iqu-e, 65 et seq.
"Such speculation did, in fact, follow immediately after the decision was
rendered. See: Josserand, La responsabilitg dit fait des automobiles devzant les
Chambres riunies de la Cour de Cassation, DALT., HEBD. (1930) Chronique, 25
et seq.; Capitant, La responsabilitj da fait des choses inamfntes apr~s l'arr~t des
Chambres riunies dui 13 fevrier 193o, ibid. 29 et seq.
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were intentional, only the future can show us; but this phrase-
ology of the decision may have a profound effect on the further
evolution of the French law of liability.
II.
The preceding study would be incomplete without at least
a reference to some special problems which arose in connection
with this topic, namely, the liability of the master for damages
caused by his servant; liability for injuries suffered by free
passengers; and, finally, liability in case of collisions. A thorough
discussion of these problems is not possible within the limits of
a single article but the nature of the problems may be indicated.
a. Vicarious Liability
The liability of the master or employer for damages caused
by his servants or employees is governed by the provision of
article 1384, § 3 which reads:
"Masters and employers rare liable] for damages caused
by their servants in the exercise of the functions for which
they have been engaged." "
The two important questions then are, first: what constitutes em-
ployment, i. e., the relationship of master and servant, and, sec-
ond: what is the exercise of functions, i. e., scope of employ-
ment.- 1 As to what constitutes employment, the language of the
'Les maitres et les commettants [sont responsable] du dommage cause
par leur domestiques et pripos6s dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont
employfs."
Cf. the similar provisions in the German Civil Code (§ 831) and the Swiss
Code of Obligations (art. 55). It should be observed that the liability of par-
ents, teachers and artisans (art. 1384, §§ 2, 4, supra note 4) can he met according
to article 1384, § 5, by proof that they could not have prevented the act in respect
of which the liability arose. On the other hand, this possibility of exoneration
has not been provided for in the language of article 1384, § 3. Cf. this with the
Swiss master-servant rule supra. The master is freed from liability if he proves
that: (i) he exercised all care, reasonable in the circumstances, to prevent
injury (which includes care in selecting the personnel, cidpa in cligendo), or
(2) that the injury would have occurred notwithstanding such care. Also, the
master can recover from the servant or employee causing the damage.
"As to the master-servant rule in French law see, LALOU, op. cit. supra
note 2, §§ 482-512; GARDENAT ET SALoN-Riccr, op. cit. supra note 5, 437-453;
BALIGAT, LA REsPONSABILIr- DU COMMErANT .k RAmso' DES FAITS DE SES
PRtPosts (Thesis 1929) Paris.
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Court of Cassation in a recent case summarizes the necessary con-
ditions as follows:
"Considering that liability for the acts of employees,
imposed by virtue of article 1384, § 3 on the master or em-
ployer, implies that this latter has the right to give orders
and instructions to the employee concerning the fulfillment
of the functions for the performance of which he was em-
ployed; that this right is based on authority and subordina-
tion without which a real employment does not exist; that
if, for a period or for a determined operation, an employer
puts his employee at the disposal of another person under
whose authority and direction he is placed, at the moment
of the accident, by virtue of a contract or by operation of
law, the liability is taken off him [the first employer] and
is imposed on the second employer only . . . 111
In applying the principle of vicarious liability to automobile
accidents, 3 the French law may be stated as follows: The em-
ployer is liable if his employee causes damage during the per-
formance of his functions; this liability exists even if he does not
properly carry out the employer's instructions. On the other hand,
no liability exists if the employee was temporarily placed under
the authority of another person,54 or if he acted beyond the scope
of his employment.5 5 On the other hand the employer may be
' Chambre de Commerce de Bordeaux v. Soc. des Nouveaux Docks Sursol,
et al., (Cass. Civ., 1924) (1924) Gaz. Pal. 1.648; DAI.L., PM. (1925) 1.134;
DAT.T, HEBD. (1925) 201. In this case an accident occurred during the discharge
of a ship, and was caused by an elevator. The elevator was operated by a
mechanic employed by appellant and put by it at the disposal of appellee com-
pany. Suit was brought against both parties by the master of the ship and the
lower courts held appellant alone liable. The decision was set aside by the Court
of Cassation, which held appellee liable.
Cf. BeaupIre v. Billard, et al, (Cour d'Appel, Angers, 1925) DA.L., HE.
(1925) 522, where the owner of a truck was held liable for damages caused while
the truck was hired because he retained authority over his chauffeur even during
hire. Cf. Dreux v. Chemin de fer Paris-Lyon-M~diterran&e, (Cass. Req.,
1924) DALI.., HID. (1924) 373, (free choice of agent; lack of authority to give
instruction to employee placed at the disposal of defendant company discharges
the latter from liability).
'On the American law, with respect to automobiles see: Chamberlain,
Automobiles and Vicarious Liability (1924) io A. B. A. J. 788; Heyting, Auto-
mobiles and Vicarious Liability (i93o) 16 ibid. 225.
" Block v. Ordoquy, et al., (Cour d'Appel, Pau, 1924) (1924) Gaz. Pal.
1.744.
wCathau v. Demangeon, (Cass. Civ., 1928) (1928) Gaz. Pal. 2.3o7; DALL.,
HEBD. (1928) 415:
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held liable for damage caused by the employee in abusing his
function.56
b. Free Passengers
Liability to persons transported for a consideration (( titre
ongreux) is not a controverted question. At first, the courts
held that proof of negligence on the part of the carrier estab-
lished a cause of action under article 1147 of the Civil Code
which deals with liability for breach of contracts. Later, espe-
cially since 1913, by invoking article 1784 of the Code, dealing
with contract of transportation, the carrier was held liable unless
he proved that the accident was due to force majeeure or a cause not
imputable to him.
5 7
In the case of gratuitous transportation (transport a titre
gratuit) " the situation is more complicated. The theory that
there exists a contractual relation between the automobilists and
the free passenger was rejected by most courts and writers,"'
although a group of jurists advocated, and some courts proceeded
on, a theory of a "gratuitous contract" (contrat de bienfaisance).°
". . . Considering that if masters and employers are liable not only
for damages caused by their servants and employees in the normal and regu-
lar exercise of the functions for the performance of which they were em-
ployed but, in addition, for those which result from the abuse of such
functions, it is so only if the employee can be considered as having acted for
the account of his employer; that the latter ceases to be liable when the
employee has been regarded by the victim of the act causing damage as
having acted not for the account of his employer but for his personal
account; . . ."
Accord: Clugnac v. de Maillard (Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux, 1gig) DALTw,
PER. (1920) 2.118.
Brunswick fr~res v. Vve. Bourne, (Cass. Req., 1919) DALL., PEP. (I920)
1.156.
. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, op. cit. supra note 2, 58o et seq. (particularly page
583) ; BtRINGUIER, op. cit. supra note 18, 233 et seq.; Chemin de fer du Midi v.
Mestelan, (Cass. Civ., 1913) DALu., PEP. (1913) 1.249, at 253; Thominaux v.
Paul, (Cass. Req., 1922) DALW., PER. (1923) 1.209, at 210; Chemin de fer de
l'Etat v. Vve. Lemain, (Cass. Civ., 1925) DAuL., PEP. (1925) 1.233; DALL.,
HEaD. (1925) 237.
B ARINxGUIE, op. cit. supra note 18, 239: "A transport is gratuitous if no
value of any nature whatsoever has been agreed upon, and will not be received
by the carrier in consideration of his services."
' De la Chapelle v. Pinel, supra note 27; Vve. Bordonnat v. Chaix, (Cour
d'Appel, Grenoble, 1924) (1924) Gaz. Pal. 2.i89; Chanal v. Vve. Monteil, (Cour
d'Appel, Lyon, 1925) DA.L., PER. (1926) 2.J26.
'Vallier v. Allary, (Trib. Civ., Avignon, 1g24) DAL.., PER. (1926) 2.128,
DAu.., H.aD. (1924) 710; Lacondemine v. Lenoir, (Cour d'Appel, Dijon, 1927)
DALL., HEBD. (1927) 440. Contra: Curvat v. Mornay, (Cour d'Appel, Lyon,
1926) DALL., HEBD. (1927) 177.
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It was, however, not long before this theory was discarded. There
is, it was argued, no contract in existence; there is no legal obli-
gation involved, the whole action being based on courtesy. Conse-
quently, liability must be determined either on the basis of article
1382 or article 1384, § i. Those who held that article 1382 should
be applied whenever injuries were inflicted on pedestrians by an
automobile while operated, naturally excluded resort to article
1384, § I with respect to free passengers. A considerable number
of jurists who advocated the application of article 1384, § I, to
automobile accidents in general, felt also that in case of a free
passenger article 1382 should determine liability. There was,
finally, a more radical group which advocated the application of
article 1384, § i even in case of free passengers."'
The courts have shown some hesitation in determining the
liability of automobilists toward free passengers. Their decisions
are unanimous in discarding the theory of contract as the basis
of liability, and usually apply article 1382 instead of article 1384,
§ 1. 2 Moreover, some jurisdictions, among them the Court of
Cassation itself, indicate a certain reluctance to hold an automo-
bilist liable for injuries caused to a free passenger. They not only
consider article 1384, § I inapplicable to such cases, but require
'Josserand, Le transport bjnivole et la responsabilitj des accidents d'auto-
mobiles, DALLT, HED. (1926) Chronique, 21 et seq. See also: VIm, op. cit.
supra note 18; LEFkVRE, DE LA RESPONSABrLITi CIVILE Ei CAS DE TRANSPORT
GRATuIT DES PERSONNES PAR AUTOMOBILE (Thesis 1927) Paris.
'De la Chapelle v. Pinel, supra note 27; Giraud v. Querel, szapra note
36; Tissandier v. Pavy, (Cour d'Appel, Poitiers, 1925) DALL., PER. (1925)
2.47, (1925) Gaz. Pal. 1.484: Devolle v. Bedel, (Trib. Civ., Thiers, 1929) DAL..,
HED. (1925) 254; Jaworski v. Faure & Peretti, (Cour d'Appel, Pau, 1925)
DALL., HEBD. (1925) 617; Lacondemine v. Lenoir, supra note 6o; Olivier v.
Jacquotot, (Cour d' Appel, Dijon, 1928) DALL, HEBD. (928) 246; Vve. Gaise v.
Saby, (Cass. Civ., 1928) DAU., PER. (1928) 1.145 DA.L., HERD. (1928) 221;
Cathau v. Demangeon, supra note 55, applying article 1382.
Contra: Allean v. Caillaud, (Cour d'Appel, Poitiers, 1925) (1925) Gaz.
Pal. 1.5o3, DA.L., PER. (1925) 2.48, applying article 1384, § I. It should be
remarked, however, that in this case the Court of Poitiers did not apply article
1384, § I to a free passenger, independently of any other factor, but considered
the gross negligence of the driver. Bader v. Julien, (Trib. Civ., Chateau-
Thierry, 1925) (1925) Gaz. Pal. 2.103; Vincent v. Liinard, (Cour d'Appel,
Douai, 1925) DALL, PER. (1926) 2.127.
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LIABILITY IN EUROPE
proof of gross negligence on the part of the driver, in order to
permit a recovery under article 1382.63
c. Collision Between Vehicles
Another problem arises in connection with the collision
between automobiles or an automobile and another kind of ve-
hicle. How should liability be determined in such a case?
Should the general law be applied, determining liability on the
basis of.the respective faults of the drivers? Or should article
1384, § I be applied? In the latter case, as has been argued with
much force by those who opposed, in principle, the application
of this article to accidents caused by automobiles while operated,
the presumption of fault against the two drivers would mutually
destroy or, rather, neutralize each other.6
4
' Jaworski v. Faur6 & Peretti, supra note 62; Jubin v. Lechand, (Trib. Civ.,
Seine, 1926) (1926) Gaz. Pal. 2.408; Olivier v. Jacquotot, supra note 62; Epoux
Plantet v. Liesse, (Trib. Civ., Seine, 1928) (1928) Gaz. Pal. z26o; Vve. Gasse
v. Saby, supra note 62:
"Considering, in fact, that the presumption instituted by article 1384,
§ i of the Civil Code against the person in control of an inanimate movable
thing, subject to the necessity of 'control' by reason of the dangers which
it may represent to others, has been established in order to protect the
victims from damages by a thing in the use of which they have not partici-
pated, in assuring them, in any case, their indemnity; that, this presumption
cannot, therefore, be invoked against the person in control of a motor
vehicle by persons who took a place in this vehicle either by virtue of a
contract, or in consequence of an act of courtesy, purely benevolent in its
nature; that the former will find protection in the obligations imposed on
the carrier by the express or implicit stipulations of the contract; that as to
those who accepted or requested to take part, gratuitously, in the use of the
vehicle, with full knowledge of the dangers to which they were exposing
themselves, they cannot recover damages from the person in control of the
automobile, unless they prove his negligence or that of his employee, impu-
table to him within the terms of articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code."
Accord: Brousse v. Guiraud, (Cass. Req., 1928) (1929) Gaz. Pal. 2.256,
DALL., HED. (1928) 382; Cathau v. Demangeon, supra note 55.
Contra: Dupont v. Vve. Langle, (Cour d'Appel, Caen, 1924) DALI, HEaD.
(1925) 33.
"Josserand, Les collisions etre les vrhiciles et la respimsabiliti cizile,
DAL., HED. (1928) Chroniqug, 33 et seq. Dean Josserand suggests the follow-
ing solution: In case of a collision between vehicles of the same category, there is
a "neutralization" of risks and each bears his own damage unless the negligence
of one of the drivers is proved. In collision between vehicles of different cate-
gories, there should be established a hierarchy according to their novelty, power
or motive-force; the more powerful should bear all damages because the crea-
tion of a greater annihilates a lesser risk and the dominant position shall carry
with it the burden of proof. Cf. i BtRINGUIER, op. cit. supra note 18, 210 et
seq. See also: Luco, op. cit. supra note i8, passim.
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The courts, in general, apply the droit coinun and determine
liability, in case of collision between two automobiles, on the
basis of article 1382. As the presumption raised by article 1384,
§ i- cannot be simultaneously invoked against both parties, it is dis-
carded.65 The same procedure is, incidentally, adopted by French
admiralty practice in ship collisions.
0 6
III.
While in France it was almost exclusively the judiciary
which brought about the development outlined above,' 7 in other
countries the legislature was more responsive and inclined to meet
the problem with adequate statutory regulations. A statute regu-
lating motor vehicle traffic was enacted by Germliany before the
war."8 This statute imposed liability regardless of fault on the
lawful possessor (Halter) for damages caused "by the operation
of a motor vehicle". This liability can be met only by proving an
inevitable event (not including, however, hidden defect or failure
of the mechanism) or contributory negligence exclusive of the
fault on the part of the possessor and of the driver."0 Liability
does not exist for damages caused to person or property conveyed
in the vehicle or to a person engaged in the operation.7 On the
other hand, the statute limits the amount which may be recovered.7 1
In Switzerland, the Intercantonal Concordat, in force between
several cantons since 1914, while it did not change the rules of
Aumont v. Soc. des Transports (Trib. Corr., Jonfleur, 1927) (1927) Gaz.
Pal. 2.35. Cf. Devos v. Lecointe, (Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1930) (1930) La
Semaine Juridique 611.
'See the law of July 15, 1915, modifying article 407 of the Code of Com-
merce. DALL, PER. (1919) 4.282.
The legislature attempted several times to meet the problem created by
the increasing number of automobile accidents by introducing bills. These bills
provided compulsory insurance in one form or another, and endeavored to facili-
tate recovery. These attempts, however, never achieved completion. For the
recent legislative efforts in France to provide statutory regulation of this prob-
lem, see: JOURNAL OFFICIaL (1922) Doc. Parl., Ch. Annexe. No. 4075, 398;
ibid. (1923) Doe. Parl., Ch. Annexe, No. 5198, 418; ibid. Doc. Part. Sen.,
Annexe, No. 21o; ibid. (1925) Doc. ParL, Ci. Annexe, No. 1519, 577.
'REICHSGFSITZILATT (190) 473 et seq. GESi-ETZ USEBR DEN VERKFHR ?IT
KRAFTFA]IRZEUGF.-1, May 3, 1909, (amended by the law of July 21, 1923, Raicns-
4GEsETrZIATT (1923) §§ 7-20.
'Ibid. §7.
"Ibid. §8.
'Ibid. § 12.
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liability, provided for compulsory insurance.7 Liability was
determined on the basis of the general law,73 i. e., on the basis
of fault, and the insurance merely purported to secure the solvency
of the defendant. Most of the Swiss cantons which are not parties
to the Concordat, or have failed to put it into effect, have provided
subsequently, by cantonal legislation, for such compulsory insur-
ance, these provisions being mostly drafted per analogiam with the
Concordat.
The post-war legislative movement was not satisfied with
merely providing for compulsory insurance to secure the solvency
of the defendant. While compulsory insurance is provided for,
the main characteristic of these statutes is that they impose liability
regardless of fault for injuries caused by motor vehicles. Such
legislation exists today in Finland, Norway and Denmark, and it is
pending in Switzerland. 74
The Finnish law of April 28, 1925 75 imposes liability on the
owner for damages caused by the motor vehicle to person or
property not conveyed in the vehicle; such liability exists regard-
less of defect in the vehicle or of the driver's negligence. The
entire liability of the owner must be covered by insurance." In
fastening the liability on the owner, the statute seems to be based
primarily on the theory of risk-bearing,-although it is provided
that under certain circumstances the owner may ultimately recover
from the driver, or the lawful possessor, but the owner is directly
liable for compensation to the injured party.77 The owner's liabil-
ity is mitigated only,-i. e., the amount of compensation may be
-20 RECUEIL OFFIcIEL 67. Concordat en viue d'une r~glementation uniforme
de la circulation des vehicules automobiles et des cycles, § iI. A Concordat is
a document similar to our interstate agreements, concluded between several can-
tons. In order to acquire the force of law, such intercantonal agreement must,
according to the Swiss Constitution, be approved by the Federal Council and
ratified by the competent cantonal authorities.
' CODE OF OBLIGATION's, Art. 41 et seq., supra note 3.
'As to compulsory liability insurance for automobilists, in some of our
States, see: Chamberlain, Compulsory Insurance of Automobiles (1926) 12 A.
B. A. J. 49; NV. J. Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insurance
(193o) 16 A. B. A. J. 363.
1SuomE~N ASErUSKOKOELaA (Finland's official journal) (1925) 557,
No. 148.
SIbid. § 13.
Ibid. §§ 2, 8.
302 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
decreased at the court's discretion,--in case of contributory negli-
gence, or if it is proved that the cause of the accident was ex-
traneous to the operation of the vehicle .7  If the car is operated
without permission, the unauthorized person is liable.79 In case
of collision, the owners are jointly liable.80 If the vehicle is
operated for public use for profit, liability exists also with respect
to damages caused to the persons conveyed by the vehicle.,' An
interesting provision is that the insurance company is liable to the
injured party even if the compensation was already paid to the
insured and the injured did not receive it.8 2  This provision,
placing the responsibility on the insurer to see that the victim is
paid, not only facilitates recovery, but also guarantees its receipt
by the injured party. However, this is the only case in which the
injured party had direct recourse against the insurance company.
The Norwegian law of February 2o, 1926 83 is similar to
the Finnish statute. It also imposes liability on the owner for
damage caused through the use of the vehicle to person or property
not conveyed in the vehicle. This liability exists regardless of
any negligence of the owner or the driver; 84 the owner's entire
liability must be covered by insurance."3 The Norwegian law,
however, extends liability in case of a vehicle operated for profit,
not only to persons, like the Finnish law, but also to property
conveyed in the vehicle. No liability exists if the victim deliber-
ately contributed to the accident or in case of the victim's exclu-
sive gross negligence; contributory negligence, on the other hand,
merely decreases the amount of compensation due from the owner,
as in the Finnish law. Finally, in case of collision, liability does
not exist with respect to damage which the vehicles cause to each
Ibid. § 5.
SIbid. §7.
s'Ibid. §§ 6, 17 (2).
SIbid. §4.
'Ibid., § io.
'Lov om nwtorvoguer; and the executive ordinance, Fyreseguer aV 20
desenber 1926 fra Arbeids-departmentet etter Lov oin motorvoguer fra 2o
februar 1926.
'Ibid. § 30.
SIbid. § iI.
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other.8 0 If the vehicle is used without the owner's permission,
the unauthorized user is liable.8 7  Contrary to the Finnish law,
which holds the owner always liable, giving him merely a possi-
bility of recoupment where a bailee actually was in possession, the
Norwegian law considers the lessee owner if the car is leased.ss
As to recovery, the law provides that the victim can sue the
insurance company directly.80
From the point of view of legislative history, Switzerland
presents as interesting a field of study as France from the point
of view of judicial history. In order to enact a federal statute
concerning automobiles, the Swiss Constitution was amended in
1921,00 and on the basis of this amendment, after a careful study
by the Department of Justice and Police, a federal law was en-
acted on February IO, 1926. A request for a referendum was
then submitted to the Federal Council, in consequence of which
the law was submitted to and rejected by a popular vote on May
15, 1927.01 The question of liability for automobile accidents
since then has been widely discussed in Swiss juristic circles and
the rejected law, in slightly modified form, will be introduced in
the Swiss legislature during its next session. 2 There seems to be
little doubt in well-informed and competent circles in Switzerland
as to the acceptance of the newly introduced bill.
The draft, in addition to regulating motor vehicle traffic,
defines the extent of liability 03 and provides for compulsory insur-
SIbid. §30.
Ibid. §31.
SIbid. §I.
Article 37 (b) : "The Confederation can legislate concerning automobiles
and cycles."
i BUNIDS13LATT (1927) 752-753.
-See "Loi fidirale sur [a circulation des vehicules automobiles et des
cycles." (Avant-projet du diparrinent fidiral de justice et police, 15 septembre
193o.) This question was the chief subject of deliberation at the last meeting
of the Swiss Ju1 its' Society held in early September, 193o, and the question of
liability was especially discussed in two comprehensive reports by two outstand-
ing jurists. See: Prof. Dr. A. Homberger, Haftpfliclht ohne Verschulden;
Prof. Max. Petitpierre, La responsabiliti causale, (Verhandhugen des Schwei-
zerischen Juristenvereins, 193o, Heft i).
" Ibid. Tit. III, c. I, arts. 31-4o.
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ance. 9 4 The purpose of the insurance, according to the motives
of the draft " is to secure the solvency of the defendant. It im-
poses liability on the lawful possessor (dtenteur) (not neces-
sarily on the owner) for all damages and injuries caused to per-
sons or property not conveyed by the vehicle, by the operation of
the automobile. This liability is based o. use, and the only
material element is causal connection between the use of the ve-
hicle and the damages (responsabilit causale.). He is freed
from liability if the accident was caused by force maJeure, gross
negligence of the victim, or the fault of a third person, exclusive
of any fault of the possessor or of persons for whom he is re-
sponsible. Ordinary negligence of the victim, on the other hand,
only gives an option to the judge to reduce the compensation due
from the possessor. The possessor is also freed from liabliity
if the vehicle was being used by a non-authorized person without
the possessor's fault.9" The liability of the possessor must be
covered by insurance; 97 the victim has direct recourse against the
insurance company.0 8
The foregoing study, however inadequate, clearly shows an
interesting evolution of law following the development of a phe-
nomenon of our changing civilization. It is indicative, first, of
the effect which this change has produced on law, and the changes
which it has wrought in well-entrenched conceptions. It indi-
cates further that in certain circumstances the traditional notion of
no liability without fault no longer satisfies the requirements of
modern life. Whether by legislation or by judicial process, every
legal system seeks to find a new, more adequate basis of liability.
Whether the change is accomplished through the artifice of a con-
clusive presumption, by shifting the burden of proof, or by pro-
viding for compulsory insurance, or simply by statutory imposition
of what may be called absolute liability, it seems that the tendency
is towards a conception of liability, based on risk, or on use, or
"Ibid. Tit. III, c. II, arts 41-45.
' See ibid. Tit. III, c. II, Renzarques introductk'es.
'Ibid. art. 3.
'Ibid. art. 41.
'Ibid. art. 41 (b).
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on the dangerous character of the instrument, rather than on the
heretofore general principle of liability based on fault or negli-
gence. A similar evolution is taking place in this country. While
it may be argued that negligence, in many cases, still would be a
more suitable test of liability than risk, use, or the dangerous
nature of the instrument, our courts or our legislatures may well
derive some benefit from the experiences and experiments which
are found in the European endeavors to bring law more in har-
mony with life.
